China studied US stealth aircraft — and learned the wrong lessons

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then China’s embrace of stealth aircraft technology is a compliment to American ingenuity.

Both awed by — and apprehensive about — U.S. stealth capabilities, China has invested heavily in developing stealth aircraft, as well as anti-stealth air defenses.

But China has learned the wrong lessons from America’s stealth program, according to U.S. Air Force analysis released this month. China is convinced that advanced technology is the foundation of U.S. stealth capabilities.

But in reality, the key to American success has been treating stealth as just one component of integrated aerial warfare, the report said.

China’s “assessments of U.S. stealth often diverge from technical reality and operational practice,” said Maj. Derek Ecklebe, a U.S. Air Force officer and a fellow at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute.

The reality is that the U.S. treats stealth “as a multifaceted capability that integrates technology with operational tactics to maintain air superiority,” he said. “Stealth technology, while expensive, complex, and important, is only part of the equation.”

China is responding to U.S. stealth warfare with a mixture of fear and confidence.

“Chinese views of stealth as an asymmetric yet counterable U.S. advantage have driven a bifurcated strategy: robust investments in layered air defenses and a rapid program to field domestically developed [low observability] aircraft,” Ecklebe said.

Ironically, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are often depicted as being fixated on technology at the expense of strategy and tactics. But in Ecklebe’s view, it is China that is overemphasizing tech.

Because Chinese experts believe that technology is at the heart of American stealth warfare, then it follows that the best defense against stealth is also technological. Thus, China has poured resources into developing anti-stealth sensors.

Chinese media and military journals suggest that better sensors, such as low-frequency radar, are the best countermeasure against stealth.

“These sources treat stealth as a technical problem to solve with new detection tools,” Ecklebe said. “They present low-frequency radars, passive sensors, and terahertz sensors as potential solutions that could soon counter U.S. advantages.”

But these stealth-busting technologies are either unproven or have limitations, such as accuracy, filtering out clutter or vulnerability to electronic warfare.

“In practice, these systems face significant physical and operational constraints,” said Ecklebe.

Nonetheless, Chinese air defenses should not be underestimated, even against stealth aircraft like the F-35 and B-2.

“What makes China’s defenses formidable is not any single radar or missile, but rather their integration into a unified IADS [integrated air defense system],” Ecklebe warned. “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has prioritized multi-domain integrated operations, pulling data from low-frequency early-warning systems, passive detectors, and even satellites into shared command centers at the corps level.^”

This same enchantment with technology applies to China’s own stealth aircraft.

China’s J-35 — which looks remarkably like the U.S. F-35 — “replicates features of the U.S. F-35 platform but prioritizes hardware metrics over U.S.-style software-defined adaptability coupled with [tactics, techniques and procedures] modernization,” said Ecklebe.

Ecklebe suggests that China’s perceptions of U.S. stealth aircraft — and their vulnerabilities — may be influenced by problems with Chinese stealth planes, which suffer from issues, such as unreliable engines.

“Mirror-imaging may further contribute to these distortions, as PLA planners project domestic constraints, such as WS-10 and AL-31F engine reliability and modernization issues that limit J-10 and J-20 sortie rates, onto U.S. systems,” he said.

One question is whether Chinese misconceptions of U.S. stealth could increase the chance of war. If Chinese leaders are convinced that better sensors can neutralize American stealth airpower, then they may feel more emboldened to invade Taiwan.

“Chinese strategists appear to view stealth not as an insurmountable barrier but as a factor that can be managed through overwhelming volume and integrated networks, leading to a deterrence posture that emphasizes rapid, decisive action to limit U.S. involvement,” Ecklebe said.