Soldiers being contacted by adversaries on LinkedIn, Reddit, Army says

The United States Army Counterintelligence Command is addressing the modern dangers soldiers are facing at the hands of foreign combatants in 2025.

On Wednesday, personnel from the wing of the Army that combats espionage hosted a panel of speakers at the Association of the United States Army conference in Washington, listing the forums where service members are being identified by enemy forces and the ways the service can combat the tide of attempted recruitment.

“LinkedIn, Indeed, Reddit, that is where our soldiers are being targeted every single day,” said Scott Grovatt, regional special agent in charge for the Northeast Region.

Soldiers coming into the Army in 2025 utilize digital devices more than ever, according to Grovatt, and many of them rely on secondary employment — unwittingly opening them up to working for a foreign entity that is spying on America.

Grovatt said the Army relies on leadership, including team leaders and squad leaders throughout the battalion level, to help soldiers understand this new arena better so they can avoid falling prey to espionage.

The regional special agent advised Army leaders to intervene if they overhear a barracks conversation in which a soldier mentions writing a paper about a new piece of technology. The paper could, in some instances, be for a foreign entity.

“Have a conversation, call counterintelligence so we can talk to them,” Grovatt said.

The onus is also on team leaders to read the fine print of any forms that came across their desk to approve secondary employment.

If personnel mentioned writing for a media outlet or online resource in their application, leaders should take a second look, comb through the fine details with the soldier and or call a counterintelligence agent.

The command has also successfully assisted with investigations into several individuals who were willingly aiding foreign adversaries in their spying campaigns.

His specific criminal charges include attempted transmission of national defense information to a foreign adversary and attempted export of controlled technical data without a license.

Lee, who held a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance, was attempting to send defense intel to Russia’s Ministry of Defense.

Schultz — who also held a top-secret security clearance — issued defense documents, photographs and other information to individuals he thought were a part of the Chinese government beginning in 2022.