A U.S. Air Force special investigation found that a lack of following proper maintenance procedures and supervision led to the death of an Alaskan airman last year.
In a 32-page report, the Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board released its findings on the incident Monday, detailing the several “human factors” that contributed to the airman’s death at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.
On March 15, 2024, Staff Sgt. Charles Crumlett, assigned to the 90th Fighter Generation Squadron, died in a workplace accident while working on a F-22 Raptor.
Crumlett was the weapons load crew chief and had been stationed at the Alaskan base since February 2024, just one month before the accident.
Crumlett, 25, enlisted in 2016 before graduating a year later as a weapons load crew member.
The report, dated Nov. 6, states that Crumlett had prior experience maintaining the A-10 and F-15 aircrafts but had only completed academic training on the F-22A.
He was working with a team to learn the hands-on portion, the report says.
The maintenance team was performing an adjustment to restraint fitting on the aircraft’s right configurable rail launcher when Crumlett suffered a fatal head injury by the CRL’s retraction, a memo on the investigation’s release states.
“There is no line-of-sight between the cockpit ladder and the right side weapons bay, and the maintenance team chief retracted the CRL when all personnel were not clear,” the report states.
The investigation board found that the “mishap” was caused by a failure to follow prescribed procedures for service of the CRL and a failure to maintain supervisory direction and awareness.
Investigators discovered that performing multiple tasks simultaneously, a proficiency level challenge and a “false sense of security” by some team members also contributed to the death.
The team multi-tasking resulted in task confusion and a lack of coordination, the investigators wrote in the report.
The proficiency level challenge is attributed to an infrequency of the job performed, and the false sense of security is linked to an “incorrect belief” on the scope of function of the safe switch for the side weapons bay.
“It seems widely believed that the ‘safe switch’ inactivates the operation of both the bay doors as well as the CRL itself when it specifically only secures the doors,” the investigators wrote. “This could engender an inaccurate sense of security in a maintainer and prompt them to take an unwarranted risk.”
Additionally, there was no clear guidance on which maintenance member was leading the task, creating more confusion.
The team members were forced to rely on nonverbal communication due to an enclosed workspace that had an auxiliary power unit in use, prompting the need for double hearing protection, the report found.
An airman gave a thumbs-up to team members to signal that he would retract the CRL, which was misinterpreted by fellow team members as all clear.
This led to Crumlett’s upper torso being inside the right-side weapons bay when the retraction was commanded, causing the immediate fatal head trauma.
Cristina Stassis is an editorial fellow for Defense News and Military Times, where she covers stories surrounding the defense industry, national security, military/veteran affairs and more. She is currently studying journalism and mass communication and international affairs at the George Washington University.
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